Glomac Plastics, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of
                            America, AFL-CIO-CLC.  n1
 
           n1 We note that the name of the Union, Textile Workers
                Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, has been changed to
            Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union of America,
             AFL-CIO-CLC, and our records so reflect the name change.
                 See American Enka Company, a Division of Akzona
                       Incorporated, 231 NLRB 1335 (1977).
 
                               Case 3-CA-5274
 
                       NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
 
          234 N.L.R.B. 1309; 1978 NLRB LEXIS 198; 97 L.R.R.M. 1441;
                1978-79 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P19,087; 234 NLRB No. 199
 
                                March 9, 1978
 
 [**1]
 
DECISION AND ORDER
 

By Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Truesdale
 
OPINION:
 
[*1309]  On September 17, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Josephine H. Klein
 issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.  Thereafter, Respondent filed
 exceptions and a supporting brief.  On March 13, 1975, the Respondent filed a
 letter memorandum on the applicability of N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc ., 420
 U.S. 251 (1975), and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union Upper South
 Department, AFL-CIO v. Quality Manufacturing Co ., 420 U.S. 276 (1975), to the
 facts in this case.
 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations
 Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority
 in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
 
The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the
 Respondent's exceptions, brief, and letter memorandum and has decided to affirm
 the rulings, findings, and conclusions n2 of the Administrative Law Judge; to
 modify her remedy so that interest is computed as set forth in Florida Steel
 Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977); n3 and to adopt her recommended Order, as
 modified herein.  n4
 
n2 We do not adopt the Administrative Law Judge's comment with respect to the
 obligations of employees who signed union membership cards during the organizing
 campaign to the extent that those comments can be construed as indicating that
 employees who continued to maintain union membership on the effective date of a
 maintenance-of-membership provision have any option not provided therein as to
 whether to be bound by that provision.
 
n3 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
 
n4 The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent's bad-faith bargaining
 commenced some 9-1/2 months into the certification year.  We agree with her
 recommendation that the entire certification year begin anew upon Respondent's
 recommencement of good-faith bargaining. Although the so-called Mar-Jac remedy
 (136 NLRB 785, 787 (1962)) is typically designed to provide an aggrieved labor
 organization with 1 year's time in which to negotiate a collective-bargaining
 agreement, we do not believe the Board is powerless to order, under proper
 circumstances, a complete renewal of a certification year, even in cases where
 there has been good-faith bargaining in the prior certification year.  Such a
 position takes cognizance not only of the realities of collective-bargaining
 negotiations as well as the realities of the effect of any bad-faith bargaining
 in the prior year, but also, more importantly, of that policy embedded in the
 Act which seeks to have the relationship between covered employees and their
 employers determined by the bargaining process and then reduced to written
 contract form.  Noting the historically unsuccessful efforts of labor
 organizations to come to such written agreement with this Respondent, and that
 bad-faith bargaining can rarely, if ever, be said to simply "start" at a
 particular moment, we believe proper circumstances exist in this case for
 ordering a complete renewal of the entire certification year.  Accordingly, we
 adopt the recommendation to that effect made by the Administrative Law Judge.
 We shall modify the Order to provide for extending the certification year for
 another full year. [**2]
 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded, and we agree, that the Respondent
 violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on April 27, 1973, by refusing to permit
 fellow employee and union negotiating committee member Dorothy Galetta to
 accompany employee Nina DePalma in an interview with DePalma's supervisor,
 Rodgers, and by disciplining DePalma for refusing to participate in the
 interview without the presence of Galetta.  The Administrative Law Judge, after
 reviewing Board and court decisions, based her conclusion primarily on Quality
 Mfg. Co ., 195 NLRB 197 (1972); Mobil Oil Corporation, 196 NLRB 1052 (1972); and
 J. Weingarten, Inc ., 202 NLRB 446 (1973), wherein a then majority of the Board
 subscribed to the view that an employee has a right to representation in an
 interview, whether the interview is strictly disciplinary or preliminarily
 investigatory. Since the Administrative Law Judge issued her Decision in this
 case, the Supreme Court has decided the issue in Weingarten, supra, and Quality
 Manufacturing, supra . In Weingarten, the Court held that it is an 8(a)(1)
 violation for an employer to deny an employee's request that a union
 representative be present at [**3]  an investigatory interview which the
 employee reasonably fears may lead to disciplinary action. In the companion
 case, Quality Manufacturing, the Court ruled that it also violates Section
 8(a)(1) for an employer to discipline an employee for refusing to accede to the
 employer's demand that such an interview be conducted in the absence of a union
 representative or to discipline union agents because they seek to furnish
 requested representation.
 
In each of these cases, the Court agreed that the action of an employee in
 seeking to have a union representative present at an investigatory interview
 "clearly falls within the literal wording of § 7." The Court held that the
 employee is clearly seeking the "aid or protection" of the union representative
 against a perceived threat to the employee's job security.  The participation of
 the representative was viewed by the majority as safeguarding the interest of
 not only the individual employee requesting assistance but also of all members
 in the unit because the representative will exercise "vigilance to make certain
 that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing
 punishment unjustly," thus also assuring the other [**4]  employees that they
 are entitled to the same aid and protection.
 
[*1310]  The Court reviewed approvingly the Board's decisions in Quality and
 Mobil Oil Corp ., n5 wherein the Board ruled that the right arises only when the
 employee requests union representation and therefore the employee may waive the
 right.  The Board in those cases limited the right to those situations where the
 employee reasonably believes that disciplinary action will result from the
 investigation; i.e., it does not apply to "run-of-the-mill shop-floor
 conversations." The Board also held that the employer has no duty to proceed
 with the interview once an employee has demanded union representation, need not
 justify its refusal to permit union representation, and may go forward with an
 investigation from other sources.  Further, the employer is under no duty to
 bargain with the union representative during an investigatory, as distinguished
 from a disciplinary, interview, and may insist on hearing only the employee's
 account of the matter being investigated.  In the instant case, there is no
 doubt that DePalma Demanded the presence of fellow employee Galetta, a member of
 the Union's negotiating committee, as a condition [**5]  of reporting to
 Supervisor Rodgers' office when ordered to do so.
 
n5 195 NLRB 197; 196 NLRB 1052.
 
The pertinent facts are: About 1 p.m. on April 27, 1973, Nina DePalma was
 summoned to the office of William Rodgers, Respondent's plant manager and her
 supervisor. On the way to the office, DePalma asked a fellow employee and union
 negotiating committee member, Dorothy Galetta, to accompany her.  After getting
 permission from her supervisor, Galetta proceeded to Rodgers' office with
 DePalma.  At the office Rodgers asked Galetta what she was doing there.  DePalma
 replied, saying the employees "had been told by a union representative not go to
 the office by ourselves unless we had a witness." Rodgers said, "Nina, you do
 not have a union and we do not recognize a union." n6 He then left temporarily
 and returned with Respondent's president, Mackessy.  Mackessy ordered the two
 employees to return to their work or punch out.  They both returned to their
 work.
 
n6 The Union was certified on June 23, 1972, and the parties were engaged in
 collective bargaining at the time of this remark.
 
Within 10 munutes, Mackessy and Rodgers approached DePalma at her machine and
 again asked her [**6]  to report to the office.  Mackessy said, "Nina, are you
 going to be sensible and come into my office or are you going to punch out and
 go home?" DePalma asked what the problem was, and Mackessy replied that he was
 "not going to discuss any labor problems on the floor." He indicated that he
 wanted to discuss her production cards, which had frequently contained errors.
 DePalma Again refused to go to the office unless accompanied by a "witness" of
 her own choosing, and accepted Respondent's alternative of checking out, which
 she did about 3 p.m., 1 hour before the end of the shift.
 
There is no dispute that DePalma demanded the presence of fellow employee
 Galetta, a member of the Union's negotiating committee, as a condition of
 reporting to Rodgers' office when ordered to do so on April 27.  Although
 Respondent contends that the purpose of the interview was not "disciplinary,"
 Rodgers conceded that "most of the times" he talked to DePalma in the office it
 was "to reprimand her for one thing or another." Rodgers had previously given
 her two written reprimands, one for errors in her production count, and admitted
 that on April 27 he intended to talk to her about her erroneous production [**7]
 counts and warn her that if her work did not improve "something more severe
 would happen." DePalma's prior history included a denied wage increase based in
 part on erroneous production cards. Thus, it is plain that her fear of
 disciplinary action had a reasonable basis.
 
In N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., supra, the Supreme Court held that it is
 an 8(a)(1) violation for an employer to deny an employee's request that a union
 representative be present at an investigatory interview which the employee
 reasonably fears might result in disciplinary action. In the companion case,
 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Upper South Department, AFL-CIO v.
 Quality Manufacturing Co., supra, the Court ruled that it also violates Section
 8(a)(1) for an employer to discipline an employee for refusing to accede to the
 employer's demand that such an interview be conducted in the absence of a union
 representative or to discipline union agents because they seek to furnish
 requested representation.
 
Section 7 of the Act guarantees to employees the right to "engage in...
 concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
 aid or protection." The Court [**8]  majority in Weingarten agreed that the
 action of an employee in seeking to have a union representative present at an
 investigatory interview "clearly falls within the literal wording of § 7." The
 employee, said the Court, is clearly seeking the "aid or protection" of a union
 representative against a perceived threat to the employee's job security.
 
We do not draw a distinction between union-represented employees and
 employees who have chosen union representation but have been deprived of the
 benefits of that representation as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain
 in good faith with their designated representative.  We agree with the
 Administrative Law Judge that "Respondent, while appearing to bargain openly and
 in good faith, was actually  [*1311]  progressively determined not to reach
 agreement...." n7 In refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union,
 Respondent effectively foreclosed its employees from enjoying any of the
 benefits of collective bargaining and in particular deprived them of the "aid or
 protection" of union representation.
 
n7 ALJD, sec. II, B,1,c.
 
The Union was certified in June 1972; bargaining ensued but in April 1973
 Respondent deliberately engaged [**9]  in bargaining tactics which the
 Administrative Law Judge found were "calculated to prevent final agreement,"
 apparently in the hope that a successful decertification petition would be
 filed.  There can be no doubt that Respondent, at the time of DePalma's request
 for union representation, had concluded that as far it was concerned the Union
 was no longer recognized as the employees' representative.  Rodgers,
 Respondent's plant manager, made this clear when he told DePalma, "Nina, you do
 not have a union and we do not recognize a union." In the Employer's view it was
 clear that its bargaining tactics had had the desired effect; i.e., the
 employees' selection of union representation had been rendered a nullity.  In
 this context of bad-faith bargaining designed to oust the Union, an employee
 more so than ever should not be denied the benefit of a vital Section 7 right.
 
The national labor policy of encouraging good-faith collective bargaining
 would be undermined if an employer were to be allowed to defeat its employees'
 right to have a representative present by engaging in unlawful bad-faith
 bargaining which the employer could then rely on the assert that no recognized
 union representative [**10]  exists.  To permit the Respondent's own misconduct
 thus to reduce or eliminate the employee's right to have a union representative
 present is to allow the Respondent's unlawful action to determine the reach and
 applicability of Section 7 rights.  We cannot reward the wrongdoer for conduct
 which violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
 
We conclude that Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees and are in no
 wise dependent on union representation for their implementation.  The Court's
 Weingarten and Quality decisions are clearly grounded on Section 7 of the Act
 which guarantees employees rights and guarantees, in particular the right of
 employees "to engage in... concerted activities for... other mutual aid or
 protection." We do not believe the Court's decisions command us to interpret
 Section 7 in a manner which is clearly restrictive of its broad scope or does
 violence to its purposes.
 
On the contrary, we believe that Justices Powell and Stewart correctly
 analyzed the scope of the Court's decision in Weingarten when they stated (420
 U.S. at 270, fn. 1.):
 
While the Court speaks only of the right to insist on the presence of a union
 representative, it must be assumed  [**11]  that the § 7 right today recognized,
 affording employees the right to act "in concert" in employer interviews, also
 exists in the absence of a recognized union.  Cf.  N.L.R.B. v. Washington
 Aluminum Co ., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
 
It is significant that the Court's majority did not comment on the
 dissenters' logical assumption of the scope of their decision.  But we need not
 rely on the dissenters' view of the Scope of Weingarten .  Our own reading of
 Weingarten and Quality persuades us that the Court's primary concern was with
 the right of employees to have some measure of protection against unjust
 employer practices, particularly those that threaten job security.These employee
 concerns obtain whether or not the employees are represented by a union.
 Indeed, these concerns are more compelling where the employees are without union
 representation as a result of their employer's misconduct.  The absence of union
 representation in such circumstances does not operate to deprive employees of
 these rights which they enjoy by virtue of the plain mandate in Section 7.
 
Accordingly, we find, in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, the
 Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)  [**12]  by refusing to permit Dorothy
 Galetta to accompany Nina DePalma at an interview in the office of Respondent's
 management and by disciplining DePalma for refusing to participate in the
 interview without the presence of Galetta.
 
ORDER
 
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
 the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
 the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that the
 Respondent, Glomac Plastics, Inc., Syracuse, New York, its officers, agents,
 successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended
 Order, as so modified:
 
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a):
 
"(a) Bargain collectively in good faith concerning wages, hours, and other
 terms and conditions of employment with Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
 Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive representative of all production
 and maintenance employees, employed by the Respondent at its 432 North Franklin
 Street, Syracuse, New  [*1312]  York, plant, excluding all office clerical
 employees, casual employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as
 defined in the Act.  Regard the Union as exclusive [**13]  agent as if the
 initial year of certification has been extended for an additional year from the
 commencement of bargaining pursuant hereto."
 
ALJ:
 
Josephine H. Klein
 
ALJ-DECISION:
 
DECISION
 
Josephine H. Klein, Administrative Law Judge: Pursuant to a charge filed on
 April 25, 1973, n1 and amended charges filed on May 2 and 6, by Textile Workers
 Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC (the Union), against Glomac Plastics, Inc.
 (Respondent), a complaint was issued on June 8, alleging that since January 26
 Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, the certified
 representative of Respondent's production and maintenance employees, in
 violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act; n2 discriminated against employee Nina
 DePalma on April 27 because of her union and/or other concerted activities, in
 violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1); and engaged in unlawful surveillance and
 other acts of interference with its employees' Section 7 rights in violation of
 Section 8(a)(1).
 
n1 Except where otherwise indicated, all dates herein are in 1973.
 
n2 National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29
 U.S.C.  § 151, et seq. ).
 
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before me in [**14]  Syracuse, New
 York, on July 11 and 12.  All parties were afforded full opportunity to be
 heard, to present oral and written evidence, and to examine and cross-examine
 witnesses.  The parties waived oral argument.Since the hearing, a brief has been
 filed on behalf of the General Counsel.
 
Upon the entire record, together with careful observation of the witnesses
 and consideration of the brief, I make the following:
 
FINDINGS OF FACT
 
I.  PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
 
The complaint alleges, the answer, as amended, admits, and I find that:
 
1.  Respondent, a New York corporation, with its place of business in
 Syracuse, New York, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of plastic products.
 During the past year, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business
 operations, manufactured and sold products valued in excess of $50,000, of which
 products valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped from its Syracuse, New York,
 plant directly to points in States other than New York.  Respondent is now and
 has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the
 meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
 
2.  The Union is now and has been at all times material herein  [**15]  a
 labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
 
II.  THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
 
A.  The Facts
 
1.  The background
 
At some time unspecified, but apparently in the 1960's, the United Mine
 Workers had been certified as the collective-bargaining representative of
 Respondent's production and maintenance employees.  According to the testimony
 of Daniel J. Mackessy, Respondent's president since the organization of the
 Company about 11 years ago, Respondent "had the Mine Workers in there for three
 years." Negotiations with that union lasted "[approximately] a year," during
 which "there was more than one" strike.  However, according to Mackessy, no
 contract was reached.  In Mackessy's words, "the thing just died a natural
 death" which the Mine Workers' business agent died during the negotiations.
 
In April 1970 the Textile Workers, the present Charging Party, commenced an
 organizational drive.  Union Business Manager Donald J. Lamb and International
 Representative Edward A. Sherman, Jr., were in charge then, as they are now.
 When the Union's demand for recognition was not met, a strike ensued, lasting
 for some 6 to 9 months.  Additionally, a charge and complaint [**16]  were filed
 alleging violations by Respondent of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.  After
 a hearing in March 1971, that complaint was dismissed by Trial Examiner Knapp,
 affirmed by the Board.  (Case 3- CA-4113, 194 NLRB 406.) n3 It was there found,
 inter alia, that the Union did not represent an uncoerced majority because of
 the participation of supervisory personnel in solicitation for the Union.
 Additionally, or alternatively, the Board held that Respondent did not violate
 Section 8(a)(5) by insisting upon an election to establish the Union's majority.
 Early in the 1970 strike Respondent sought an injunction against the Union's
 picketing from a state court, n4 which "issued an order laying down certain
 rules to govern the conduct of the picketing." 194 NLRB at 408, fn. 16. The
 evidence at the present hearing suggests that the court "order" was an agreement
 of the parties as to rules governing the picketing.
 
n3 Although not requested to do so at the present hearing, I am here taking
 official notice of prior Board action in complaint proceedings involving
 Respondent.
 
n4 Trial Examiner Knapp identified the issuing court as the "New York Supreme
 Court." At the present hearing, Mackessy spoke of it as a "City Court." [**17]
 
Upon another charge filed in December 1971 a complaint was issued against
 Respondent and a hearing held on March 21, 1972.  Trial Examiner Silberman found
 that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees
 with delay or possible denial of contemplated wage increases because an unfair
 labor practice charge had been filed against Respondent.  He further found,
 however, that the General Counsel had not proven an allegation that Respondent
 had unlawfully prohibited employee Nina DePalma from soliciting for the Union.
 No exceptions were filed and the Trial Examiner's Decision was thereupon adopted
 by the Board.  (Case 3-CA-4715, Board's Order dated June 2, 1972.)
 
On May 31, 1972, the Union filed a charge alleging that DePalma had been
 discriminatorily denied a wage increase  [*1313]  in violation of Section
 8(a)(1), (3), and (4).  Administrative Law Judge Saunders found that alleged
 violation, but, on exceptions, the Board reversed and dismissed the complaint.
 (Case 3- CA-4881, 201 NLRB 450 (1973).)
 
Pursuant to a Board-conducted election, the Union was certified on June 23,
 1972.  Contract negotiations then ensued, with the first meeting held on August
 9, 1972.  [**18]  After the ninth meeting, on November 13, 1972, the Union filed
 a refusal-to-bargain charge.  This was dismissed by the Regional Director and
 his action was affirmed by the General Counsel on appeal.
 
The original charge in the present case, alleging refusal to bargain, was
 filed on April 25, after the 13th negotiating session.  Two subsequent meetings
 were held, on May 7 and 29.  On June 6 the Union filed a second amended charge,
 n5 alleging, in addition to Respondent's refusal to bargain, its discriminatory
 discharge of DePalma on April 26.  n6
 
n5 The first amended charge, filed on May 4, alleged discriminatory discharge
 of two other employees.  This allegation, however, was not included in the
 complaint.
 
n6 Actually, as the complaint and the evidence disclose, DePalma was not
 discharged but, rather, briefly suspended.
 
2.  The bargaining
 
Until the time of the present hearing, 15 bargaining sessions had been held.
 At each of these meetings the Union was represented by Lamb and/or Sherman,
 together with a negotiating committee of four employees.  At all the meetings,
 Respondent was represented by George Sullivan, Esq., accompanied by his
 associate, Kevin M. Reilly, Esq.,  [**19]  and Mackessy.  Sullivan, who also
 represented Respondent at the present hearing, was Respondent's chief spokesman
 in the negotiations. The decisions cited above disclose that Reilly represented
 Respondent in the prior proceedings.
 
From the beginning of the negotiations it was agreed by the parties that no
 agreements reached on specific items were to be considered "final" until
 agreement had been reached on a total contract.  It would serve no useful
 purpose to review the course of the negotiations, since it is undisputed that
 the area of disagreement was eventually narrowed down to two items, namely,
 wages and "union security" with the related checkoff of union dues.It is
 primarily Respondent's conduct with regard to these two items which is alleged
 as violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
 
a.  Union Security and Checkoff
 
The Union originally requested a standard 30-day union-security and
 dues-checkoff provision.  Sullivan, on behalf of Respondent, objected to having
 employees required to join the Union and pay dues, and to Respondent's being
 required to fire employees who refused to join. In its initial contract
 proposal, on August 9, 1972, Respondent proposed the following [**20]
 maintenance-of-membership and duescollection provisions:
 
MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP
 
Section 1.  Employees in the bargaining unit covered by this Agreement who
 are presently members of the Union, and any employee in the bargaining unit
 covered by this Agreement who may hereafter become a member of the Union during
 the terms of this Agreement, shall maintain the membership in good standing as
 to the payment of initiation fees, assessments and dues as a condition of
 employment during the term of this Agreement.
 
The Company shall not be obligated to discharge any employee who is a member
 of the Union and who shall have failed to maintain his Union membership by the
 payment of his dues, assessments or initiation fees until the expiration of
 thirty (30) days after written notification by the Union to the Company that
 said employee is not in good standing, during which period said employee shall
 be given an opportunity to reinstate himself as a member of the Union in good
 standing.
 
COLLECTION OF DUES
 
Section 2.  The Union agrees that it and its members will not solicit dues
 during working hours.  The Company will provide a special place for the
 Treasurer to collect dues before or after [**21]  working hours or during the
 noon hour.
 The Union rejected Respondent's proposal.
 
On September 13, 1972, the Union offered a modified provision, substituting
 for an express requirement that employees be discharged for nonmembership in the
 Union a provision that "Employees shall maintain good standing in the Union...
 and shall be disqualified from employment for so long as they do not comply."
 Then, on October 4, 1972, the Union offered a modified agency-shop proposal, as
 follows:
 Each employee who has become a member of the Union, or has become a member as of
 this dated Agreement, or thereafter, shall maintain his membership as a
 condition of employment.  An employee who does not comply with these
 requirements, shall pay the equivalent in dues, to the Union financial office,
 by check, with a statement for same, on each pay week of each month or
 subsequent payday as a condition of employment.
 This was coupled with a more flexible checkoff provision than the Union's
 original demand.
 
Throughout this time Respondent adhered to its original
 maintenance-of-membership proposal.  Lamb, on the other hand, said that he would
 be "the laughing stock of the International" if he agreed  [**22]  to a contract
 without some form of union-security and checkoff provisions.  Thereupon Sullivan
 suggested, as a face-saving gesture for Lamb, that the relevant provisions be
 omitted from the contract and that, instead, Respondent would execute a separate
 commitment, or "letter of intent," providing for maintenance of membership.
 Under date of March 5, 1973, Respondent reduced this suggestion to writing, in
 the form of a letter signed by Mackessy setting forth the
 maintenance-of-membership and dues-collection provisions contained in
 Respondent's original contract proposal.  At the next meeting,  [*1314]  on
 March 30, the Union rejected this proposal.  At this time the Union, having
 presented its economic demands about 2 months previously, pressed Respondent for
 its wage proposal.  As set forth below, the Company thereupon offered a 1-year
 contract with a 5 percent increase, to be distributed on a "merit" basis.
 
Under date of April 4, Sullivan wrote to the Union ostensibly "revising"
 Respondent's proposal for a maintenance-of-membership commitment.  The
 "revision" was actually a withdrawal, with Respondent now offering only to
 provide a place for the collection of dues on nonworking time.  Thereafter
 [**23]  Respondent refused to reinstate its offer of a maintenance-of-membership
 provision when the Union offered to accept with a 6-percent across-the-board
 wage increase.
 
Mackessy testified that he was responsible for Respondent's change of
 position, based on a growing doubt that the Union still represented a majority
 of the unit employees.  He attributed this doubt to three factors.
 
First, Mackessy testified that some employees had informed him that, although
 they had signed union cards n7 and had voted for the Union, they did not want
 to join the Union or pay dues.  Mackessy testified that some of the employees
 made such statements "right after the election," which was held on June 15,
 1972, but the number increased in the spring of 1973.  He estimated the number
 of employees who spoke to him in that vein in the spring as from 10 to 15, out
 of the 100 to 120 in the bargaining unit.  He testified that the last of these
 employees had spoken to him possibly 3 or 4 days before he instructed Sullivan
 to withdraw the maintenance-of-membership proposal.  Mackessy refused at the
 hearing to identify any of the employees who he said had communicated to him
 their reluctance to join the Union [**24]  or pay union dues.  n8 He purported
 to base his refusal to identify the employees on a fear that they would be
 subjected to "reprisals." When questioned as to the basis of any such fear, he
 said: "Well, we've had a bomb threat at the plant. The employees said they've
 been threatened." He did not specify the date of the alleged "bomb threat" and
 provided to reason for believing that it was related to the Union.  Further, he
 testified that, although it allegedly occurred at 4:30 a.m., on the third shift,
 no action was taken and it was not reported to the police until "the next day."
 The plant was neither evacuated nor searched by Respondent or the police.
 Mackessy conceded that he did not take the threat seriously.  n9
 
n7 In Case 3- CA-4113, 194 NLRB 406 at 407, the union cards are described as
 indicating that "the signing employee accepted membership in the Union and
 designated it his bargaining representative." There is no evidence that
 Respondent knew the precise nature of the cards.
 
n8 Upon Mackessy's refusal to identify the allegedly complaining employees,
 the General Counsel moved to strike all Mackessy's testimony on this subject.  I
 denied the motion to strike, but stated for the record that I should take the
 refusal into cinsideration in appraising the evidence as a whole.
 
n9 Mackessy's testimony was:
 
WITNESS: We got a call.  They called the plant about, oh, 4:30 in the
 morning.
 
JUDGE KLEIN: Who's they?
 
WITNESS: A woman's voice.  And a girl called me from the plant. She said she
 answered the phone, and she said she got a call that you better get everybody
 out of here, someone planted a bomb.
 
JUDGE KLEIN: Did you report this to the police?
 
WITNESS: I reported it to the police the next day.
 
JUDGE KLEIN: What did the police do about it?
 
WITNESS: They just told me to generally... to just keep the security measures
 up, keep the building we lighted, try to keep the windows...
 
JUDGE KLEIN: They didn't come around and inspect?
 
WITNESS: No, they didn't...
 
JUDGE KLEIN: What did you do in between 4:30 in the morning and the next day,
 with a bomb threat?
 
WITNESS: Nothing.  What could I do?...
 
JUDGE KLEIN: Did you go back to the plant?
 
WITNESS: The police came in and told us I've had these before years ago and
 they said they could never search a place like this, it's so complicated.
 
JUDGE KLEIN: Did you take this bomb threat seriously?
 
WITNESS: Oh, No.
 
JUDGE KLEIN: But you take it seriously now, so that you refused to answer
 questions as a hearing?
 
WITNESS: I wouldn't want to implicate innocent people. [**25]
 
The only other basis Mackessy claimed for his professed fear that employees
 might be subject to "reprisals" by the Union was an alleged incident involving
 employee Sharon Richardson.  Mackessy testified that, on May 3, William C.
 Saunders, a supervisor, told him that Richardson had told Saunders that "a man
 grabbed her arm when she was coming to work the other day." Mackessy testified
 that "to get the story firsthand," they called Richardson into the office, where
 she said that "some fellow grabbed her by the arm, prevented her from coming to
 work." Mackessy showed her some pictures and "she picked out Mr. Sherman's."
 Mackessy informed her that Respondent could do nothing because Sherman was not
 an employee.  At Richardson's request, however, Mackessy called the police.  In
 the presence of Mackessy, Rodgers, and Saunders, a police officer took
 Richardson's story.  He then told her that she could go to the police office if
 she want to file a formal complaint.  Mackess testified that he did not know if
 there had been a followup.  Rodgers was not examined about this matter.  Neither
 Richardson nor Saunders testified.  Sherman unequivocally denied the conduct
 attributed to him.
 
It  [**26]  may also be noted that the supposed defectors from the Union
 apparently did not fear union "reprisals." Mackessy testified that they told him
 of their antiunion sentiments while at work, declining his suggestion that they
 withdraw to the privacy of his office.  (See fn. 10, infra .)
 
The second factor Mackessy listed as creating a doubt as to the Union's
 continuing majority support was the relatively small number of employees who
 joined three 1-day strikers which it was stipulated that the Union called on
 April 23 and May 1 and 7.  He referred to attendance records which presumably
 would reflect the lack of support for the strike, but none was produced.  He
 testified that Plant Manager William R. Rodgers and Saunders had examined the
 attendance records and reported that attendance on the days of the strike was
 close to normal, with attendance on May 7 even better than usual.  Although
 Rodgers testified at the hearing, he was not examined as to this matter.
 Saunders did not testify.  Because Mackessy obviously equated striking with
 picketing, his estimates as to the number of employees who participated in the
 strike are of no value.
 
[*1315]  In any event, whether relatively low employee [**27]  participation
 in the strikes would warrant legitimate doubt as to the Union's majority, it
 could not possibly explain Mackessy's action in the present case since the first
 of the strikes occurred on April 23, whereas the letter withdrawing the
 maintenance-of-membership proposal was sent on April 4.  Since Mackessy
 testified affirmatively that the lack of employee support for the strikes was
 the major, if not sole, basis for his doubt of the Union's majority, n10 I
 totally discredit his testimony as to his reason for withdrawing the
 maintenance-of-membership proposal.
 
n10 On direct examination he testified as follows:
 Well, after the election which is approximately a year ago, things were going
 kind of smooth but it... but in the last, I'd say four or five months, the
 employees, when I'd go through the shop and as Nina [DePalma] has related,
 they'd stop me and quite a number of them said, "I'd like to talk to you." And I
 said, "Do you want to come in the office?" They may have a personal problem and
 it's our practice not to get into discussions on the floor.  And they'd say,
 "No, I just want to tell you this, that I signed the card I want you to know,
 but I don't want to join the union and I don't want to pay dues."
 
So I took this with a grain of salt because I said, "Well, you had a union
 vote, we abide by the court and that's it.  You've got a union now." But then
 the last two strikes when there was 12 people out and 8 people out, that
 presented a different picture and I said that there is some truth to this
 statement that these people are making because a lot of times they'll tell me
 one thing and do the opposite.  I'm not that naive.  But I know how many people
 are out by the attendance records.  So I said, "Well, there's more or less the
 handwriting on the wall."
 
Q.  (By Mr. Sullivan) Well, thereafter did you instruct me to do a certain
 thing in relation to....
 
A.  Yes, I contacted you and I said, "I'm afraid we'll have to change our
 position.  We can no longer offer the Union this signed agreement or agency shop
 or whatever else you may call it.  We just can't fire people because they don't
 want to join the union under any circumstances...." [**28]
 
The third factor that Mackessy mentioned as creating doubt of the Union's
 majority was the substantial turnover of employees within the unit.  Without
 providing any details, he said that Respondent had had "maybe 200" new employees
 "since the first of the year." His testimony continued:
 ...  And a lot of the new people coming in were asking questions and we told
 them that there's a union here now and they should see their business agent.
 But as time grew on, it became evident of what their wishes were and that's what
 prompted the letter.
 From "shop conversation with the employees and talking to [his] department
 heads," Mackessy "had a feeling" that the employees did not want the Union.
 
But, as previously stated, Mackessy testified that only 10 to 15 employees
 spoke to him about the matter in the spring of 1973.  He did not identify the
 "department heads" with whom he said he had talked and none of them testified.
 He gave no details as to his conversations with them.  Accordingly, there is no
 credible evidence that "new" employees were generally antiunion or that original
 union supporters had generally been replaced.
 
b.  Wages
 
At the outset of negotiations the parties [**29]  agreed that economic
 matters would be left to the end of the negotiations. However, on January 26 the
 Union presented its detailed and somewhat elaborate economic demands, which were
 repeated in writing under date of February 7.  Respondent received these demands
 reluctantly, since there were still outstanding unresolved noneconomic matters.
 However, on March 30 Respondent counterproposed a 1-year contract with an
 additional holiday and a 5-1/2-percent wage increase to be distributed among the
 unit employees on a merit basis.  n11 On April 17 the Union countered with a
 request for a 6-percent across-the-board increase, which was summarily denied by
 Respondent.  The Union then suggested that the matter be referred to binding
 arbitration, but Respondent rejected this suggestion.
 
n11 Sullivan first stated the offer as a 2-year contract, with an increase of
 5-1/2 percent each year, in addition to the extra holiday.  Mackessy, however,
 immediatly protested and, after a caucus, the offer was changed, Sullivan
 apparently having misunderstood Mackessy's position.
 
The General Counsel contends that Respondent unlawfully refused to provide
 the Union with information as to the identity [**30]  of the employees who would
 receive merit increases under Respondent's proposal.  The evidence relevant to
 this contention will be summarized.
 
The Union repeatedly asked Respondent's representatives to identify the
 employees who would receive merit increases.  Respondent, however, maintained
 that it would not and/or could not provide this information.  According to Lamb,
 Sullivan said that "this would be and arbitrary distribution by the Company to
 the employees who they thought deserved it and it would be based upon attendance
 and performance." Sherman testified that Sullivan said no list of employees to
 receive raises could be provided "until after the contract was signed." The
 distribution of the raise would not be grievable.
 
Mackessy, on the other hadn, maintained that, while it was true that
 individual wage increases or the denial thereof would not be subject to
 bargaining or to the grievance procedure, he contemplated some sort of objective
 "point" system, under which employees would be evaluated.  Such evaluations
 would be made anonymously, by using timeclock numbers, to avoid the possibility
 of favoritism.  When asked about the proposed point system at the hearing,
 Mackessy [**31]  was characteristically vague.  Although he indicated that he
 had explained the so-called point system to the union representatives in the
 course of the negotiations, he later said that they "didn't go into depth with
 the union because the union rejected it" and Respondent's representatives did
 not explain to the Union the role that seniority would play in the evaluations.
 Lamb denied that a "point system" was discussed at all.n12 Neither Sullivan,
 Respondent's chief negotiator, nor Reilly, his  [*1316]  associate, who had
 attended and maintained notes of the negotiating sessions, appeared as a
 witness.  n13
 
n12 See Case 3- CA-4881, 201 NLRB 450, 451 (1973):
 
The Respondent's president, Daniel Mackessy, explained that in late 1971 he
 asked three or four of his supervisors to compile a list of employees, by clock
 numbers, who were entitled to a wage increase, and said that the selections were
 to be based on past performances, ability to follow instructions, absence of
 warnings and violations of rules, and their absenteeism and tardiness was also
 to be considered.  He said that out of 80 employees working in the plant about
 23 percent received wage increases.  The Respondent then introduced various
 production cards showing the different pieces produced by employees during
 certain periods of time....
 It does not appear that any reference was made to the 1971 increases in the
 course of the present negotiations.
 
n13 Sullivan repeatedly attempted, in effect, to give testimony in the form
 of leading questions put to witnesses.  Since Sullivan was obviously in the best
 position to provide reliable testimony concerning the crucial facts, it would
 have been advisable for him to appear as a witness, with Respondent represented
 by other counsel at the hearing.  ABA Code of Professional Responsibility ,
 cannon 5, EC 5-9, EC 5-10, DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102. [**32]
 
Without contradiction, Lamb quoted Sullivan as having expressly disclaimed
 inability to pay as Respondent's reason for rejecting the Union's final demand
 for a 6-percent across-the-board increase.  Yet in the course of negotiations
 Respondent asserted that even the 5-1/2 percent it had offered was so burdensome
 as possibly to result in the layoff of half the employees.
 
Lamb and Sherman both quoted Mackessy as having said that Respondent had lost
 two customers because he had entered bids on contracts at prices including the
 contemplated 5-1/2-percent increase.  Mackessy testified that he had said only
 that he had lost two contracts, rather than two customers.  He testified that he
 had increased by 5-1/2 percent the prices he bid for the production of two parts
 for the Carrier Corporation and, as a result, he lost out to Erie County
 Plastics, a competitor.  When asked why he had added 5-1/2 percent of the total
 price rather than merely 5-1/2 percent of the labor cost component, Mackessy
 said he had done so to prevent his competitors' being able to figure out his
 hourly rate.  He did not further explain.  In any event, hourly wage rates
 apparently are not totally secret, since Mackessy [**33]  was able to testify
 concerning those of Erie County Plastics.  Further, Mackessy revealed that had
 been given the opportunity to meet the competitor's bids, but he declined, since
 they were 8 percent lower than Respondent's.n14 Thus he would not have been the
 low bidder even without the 5-1/2-percent additions.  According to Mackessy,
 although Respondent makes some 200 bids per week, the two Carrier bids were the
 only ones on which he had added the 5-1/2 percent, but they amounted to some §
 100,000, or possibly 10 percent of Respondent's "total volume."
 
n14 This testimony is essentially inconsistent with Mackessy's prior refusal
 to testify concerning the competitive bids on the ground of a vaguely defined
 legal requirement of confidentiality as to information he had obtained from
 "private sources."
 
Cross-examination of Mackessy further elicited information that Carrier
 Corporation had previously complained of Respondent's poor production of one of
 the two parts involved.  n15 According to Mackessy, Erie County Plastics is also
 now experiencing difficulty in production of that part.
 
n15 See also Case 3- CA-4881, 201 NLRB 450, supra at 451, where it is stated
 that Mackessy testified that "the Company lost its number one customer --
 Carrier Corporation" in part, at least, as a result of lost production because
 DePalma had broken an expensive mold in February 1971. [**34]
 
On the basis of Mackessy's demeanor, together with the vagueness and
 inconsistencies in his testimony and his refusal to answer some questions for
 unpersuasive reasons, I find him a generally unreliable witness and discredit
 his uncorroborated testimony whenever it conflicts with other evidence.
 Specifically in connection with the wage negotiations, I discredit his testimony
 that Respondent's representatives, either he or Sullivan, presented a detailed
 "point system" for determining the distribution of the proposed 5-1/2-percent
 merit wage increase.
 
3.  Surveillance
 
The complaint alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful surveillance of its
 employees' activities by photographing the pickets during each of the three
 1-day strikes, conducted on April 23 and May 1 and 7.  There is no dispute that
 Mackessy and Rodgers (and possibly another company representative) openly and
 repeatedly photographed pickets from distances ranging from 3 to about 12 feet.
 With the possible exception of two incidents, the uncontradicted evidence
 establishes that the pickets did not trespass on Respondent's property and did
 not engage in mass picketing, violence, injury to person or property or any
 [**35]  other unlawful conduct.
 
The first possible exception to the Union's pattern of completely lawful
 picketing is the Sharon Richardson incident, discussed above.  First it should
 be noted that, as Mackessy testified, he first learned of this alleged incident
 on May 6, after Respondent had photographed the pickets during the first two
 strikes, on April 23 and May 1.  Second, for the reasons heretofore set forth, I
 have discredited the purely hearsay evidence of the incident.  Finally, even if
 the hearsay were to be credited, there is no suggestion that any picketing
 employees engaged in misconduct.  The evidence concerned only Union
 Representative Sherman, while Respondent admittedly photographed picketing
 employees.
 
The other possible exception to the peaceful and orderly picketing occurred
 on April 23, during the first 1-day strike.  Sherman testified that at or about
 10:30 or 11 a.m. that day a delivery truck drove up.  Seeing the picket line,
 the driver alighted and went into the plant to telephone his employer for
 instructions.  He emerged a short time later and said he had been directed to
 make the delivery and intended forthwith to drive into the plant grounds.  The
 pickets [**36]  announced that they would continue walking.  When the truck
 started to back into the plant driveway, the pickets sat down on the roadway.
 At that point Sherman arrived on the scene and ordered the pickets to get up,
 which they did immediately.  They resumed their walking and the truckdriver said
 he would not try to enter at that time.  About 5 minutes later the police
 arrived, presumably having been summoned by Respondent.  Sherman assured the
 police that the pickets would obey the law.  The pickets then stood aside; the
 truck proceeded into the plant grounds; and the police departed.  According to
 Sherman, the truck delivery was delayed about half an hour in all.  There is no
 suggestion that any such conduct by the strikers was repeated.  And at no time
 did Respondent refer to this incident in justification of its photographic
 activities.
 
Mackessy maintained that he had had photographs taken on the advice of
 Respondent's auditors, the police, a manufacturers' association, and a
 publication of the Textile Workers Union.
 
He said that the auditors had recommended that he have "before and after"
 pictures to support charging off as an  [*1317]  expense for tax purposes any
 damage that might [**37]  be done to the plant by the pickets. Apparently such
 advice had allegedly been given in connection with the Textile Workers' 1970
 strike, although Mackessy revealed that he had also taken pictures during the
 earlier strikes conducted by the Mine Workers.
 
He said that in 1970 and continuing "right up to this date" the "Police
 Department asked [him] to take photographs of these individuals that came from
 out of town." So far as appears, Lamb and Sherman were the only out-of-towners
 involved, yet photographs were taken of picketing employees.  Indeed, on direct
 examination Mackessy testified, inter alia , that he "took pictures to identify
 the employees."
 
He originally testified that in 1973 the manufacturers' association "was
 getting reports and there was a compilation of data that wherever this Textile
 Workers Union was operating within there was forms of some building damage or
 personal property damage." He later recanted, saying: "I think in all fairness,
 I think that statement [that there is always property damage where the Textile
 Workers Union is present] may have originated with me."
 
On cross-examination, Mackessy produced a pamphlet he relied on to support
 his prior [**38]  testimony that the Textile Workers Union itself recommended
 taking pictures. The pamphlet turned out to be an issue of the "American Textile
 Reporter," an industry trade journal.
 
Mackessy conceded that, when he and Rodgers took photographs of the pickets,
 he had no intention of instituting any proceedings before the Board.  Although
 Respondent called the police several times, it does not appear that it intended
 to, or had any reasonable grounds to, institute any judicial action.  Apparently
 Mackessy considered the picture-taking as a precautionary measure, saying: "It
 seemed like the pictures served a good record and served us well in the past and
 I never had an objection from anybody having their picture taken unless they had
 something to hide." Mackessy took numerous pictures because, "since the Polaroid
 Camera came in, everybody was taking pictures."
 
4.  The DePalma matter
 
DePalma has been employed by Respondent as a machine operator since sometime
 in 1969.  She has been an openly ardent supporter of the Union since its
 original appearance on the scene in 1970.  n16 She is frank and outspoken and
 given to displaying a type of taunting humor, which Respondent has indulged with
 [**39]  good grace.  As appears from the prior Board decisions and the present
 record, she has had a stormy career as an employee.  She has been reprimanded
 and disciplined frequently.  In October 1971 she was reprimanded for having
 solicited for the Union during worktime.  In April she was denied a wage
 increase because of deficiencies in her work.  n17
 
n16 In Case 3-CA-4715, supra , Trial Examiner Silberman said: "Mrs. DePalma
 is passionately involved in the organizing campaign being conducted among
 Respondent's employees."
 
In Case 3- CA-4881, 201 NLRB at 452, Administrative Law Judge Saunders said:
 "There is no question that DePalma has been extensively involved in the
 prolonged organizing campaign among Respondent's employees and, admittedly, the
 Company had knowledge of her active and continual involvement."
 
n17 This was the Board's finding, reversing the Administrative Law Judge's
 holding that DePalma had been discriminatorily denied the wage increase in
 violation of Sec. 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
 
Rodgers, who has been with Respondent as plant manager for about a year and a
 half, testified that before April 27 he had called DePalma into the office
 around 10 times.He [**40]  conceded that, except for new employees whom he wants
 to meet, employees are called into the office only to be given a disciplinary
 layoff, a written reprimand, or an oral warning of possible formal discipline
 unless some deficiency is rectified.  DePalma estimated that during her
 employment she had been called into the office 20 times, the most recent being 2
 weeks before the event here involved.  Rodgers testified that he had given
 DePalma two written warnings: one for refusal to obey his orders, the other for
 failure to follow her group leader's instructions.  n18 In February she had
 received a disciplinary layoff of 3 days for insubordination in refusing to go
 to the office when called in.
 
n18 In 201 NLRB 450 at 451, it is said: "Mackessy testified [that]... usually
 a third warning slip results in discharge." Similarly, in Case 3- CA-4113, 194
 NLRB 406, supra at fn. 22, it is said: "Any employee who received three warning
 slips (see G.C. Exh. 20) was subject to automatic discharge."
 
On April 27, at or about 1 p.m., DePalma was asked to report to Rodgers'
 office.  She thereupon went to the assembly department and asked employee
 Dorothy Galetta, a fellow member of the  [**41]  Union's negotiating committee,
 to accompany her.  After getting permission from her supervisor, Galetta
 proceeded to Rodgers' office with DePalma.  Upon their arrival, Rodgers asked
 Galetta what she was doing there.  DePalma replied, saying the employees "had
 been told by a union representative not to go into the office by ourselves
 unless we had a witness." At that point Rodgers said: "Nina, you do not have a
 union and we do not recognize a union." He then left temporarily and returned
 with Mackessy.  Mackessy ordered the two employees to return to their work or
 punch out.  They both returned to their work.
 
Within 5 or 10 minutes, Mackessy and Rodgers approached DePalma at her
 machine and again asked her to report to the office.  Mackessy said: "Nina, are
 you going to be sensible and come into my office or are you going to punch out
 and go home?" DePalma asked what the problem was, and Mackessy replied that the
 was "not going to disucss any labor problems on the floor." He indicated that he
 wanted to discuss her production cards, which frequently contained errors.
 Again refusing to go to the office unless accompanied by a "witness" of her own
 choosing, DePalma took the alternative [**42]  of checking out, which she did at
 or about 3 p.m., 1 hour before the end of the shift.
 
About half an hour later, Galetta was called to the office of Saunders, her
 suprevisor.  According to Galetta's uncontradicted testimony, Saunders said that
 in the future, in order to receive permission to go to the office, she would
 have to state her reasons and the supervisors would decide whether to grant
 permission.  He added that she "could not go for any union purposes."
 
On the next workday, Rodgers and DePalma's group leader spoke to her at her
 work station.  Rodgers informed her that she had made a mistake on her
 production card  [*1318]  and that "[count] is very important." According to
 DePalma, Redgers then told her to sure of accurate counts in the future "and
 let's forget what happened in the past and go on from there." That was
 apparently the end of the matter.  However, it appears that in April 1972
 erroneous production cards were stated as a substantial part of the reason
 DePalma was denied a wage increase. (201 NLRB 450 at 451.) Errors in her
 production cards, and verbal reprimands therefor, had been the subject of
 flippant notes she appended to some of her cards. Respondent did not  [**43]
 resent her humor.
 
Testifying as to the April 27, 1973, incident Rodgers did not contradict
 DePalma and Galetta in any substantial respect.  However, it was his position
 that calling DePalma into the office was essentially routine and not a "
 disciplinary" matter.  He testified first that he called an average of three or
 four employees per day into the office to discuss various work problems.  He
 later raised this figure to an average of 10 to 12 employees called into the
 office each day.
 
Rodgers testified specifically that April 27 was the first time that DePalma
 had brought anybody with her when she was called into the office and that she
 had come alone a few weeks earlier, when he spoke to her about her "attendance
 performance." However, in case 3-CA-4715, it is disclosed that on October 21,
 1971, DePalma objected to meeting alone with Company officials [and so], with
 Mackessy's permission, she was accompanied by another employee" when she
 reported to the office as directed.  While the event there involved occurred
 before Rodgers' tenure began, Mackessy was involved in both the October 1971 and
 April 1973 incidents.
 
B.  Discussions and Conclusions
 
1.  Refusal to bargain [**44]
 
a.  Union security
 
The complaint alleges, inter alia , that on April 4, 1973, Respondent
 "withdrew from an agreement previously arrived at with the Union." The reference
 obviously is to the maintenance-of-membership provision.  The record is clear,
 however, that the Union had rejected Respondent's proposal of a
 maintenance-of-membership provision and no agreement had thus been reached
 before Respondent withdrew its proposal.  Additionally, from the outset it had
 been mutually understood that no tentative agreements on any specific items were
 to be considered binding until agreement was reached on an entire contract.
 Since the matter of wages was still open on April 48 there could not have been
 any binding agreement on the maintenance-of-membership provision at that time.
 Thus the General Counsel had failed to establish the allegation that Respondent
 unlawfully withdrew agreement on any issue.
 
The complaint further alleges, however, that Respondent "negotiated with the
 Union in bad faith with no intention of entering into any final or bidning
 collective-bargaining agreement." As previously stated, by April 4 agreement had
 been reached on all portions of the contract except [**45]  for wages and the
 union-security checkoff provisions.  It is the General Counsel's position that
 Respondent's withdrawal of its offer of a maintenance-of-membership provision
 was intended as a stalling tactic, designed to keep negotiations going until the
 end of the certification year, in June, at which point a decertification
 petition could be filed.  While withdrawal of an offer previously made does not
 in itself necessarily violate the statutory obligation to bargain, it may be a
 significant fact indicating bad faith.  See, e.g., Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co
 ., 146 NLRB 420, 430 (1964) [enfd.  365 F.2d 321 (C.A. 5, 1966)]; Shovel Supply
 Company, Inc ., 162 NLRB 460, 473 (1966), and cases there cited.  Thus
 Respondent's withdrawal of its proposal of a maintenance-of-membership provision
 and its refusal to reinstate such offer are material in appraising Respondent's
 good or bad faith in the negotiations.
 
It has been held that, although it is unlawful for an employer to withdraw
 recognition of and discontinue negotiations with a union because of doubt as to
 its continuing majority within the certification year, it is not unlawful for
 the employer to withdraw an offer of a  [**46]  unionshop provision because of
 such doubt within the certification year.  S & L Co., of Billings , 159 NLRB 903
 (1966). It is reasonable for an employer to resist compelling employees to join
 a union, upon penalty of discharge, when he has reasonable cause to believe that
 a majority of the employees disapprove and may soon want to exercise their right
 to be rid of the union.  See Furr's Cafeteria, Inc ., 179 NLRB 240 (1969), in
 which a panel majority held that an employer did not violate the Act by
 adamantly insisting upon a short-term contract when, shortly after the
 certification, it acquired a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority.  In
 both S & L and Furr's Cafeteria the employers offered maintenance-of-membership
 clauses despite their doubts as to the unions' majorities.
 
Thus, while an employer generally may not refuse to recognize and bargain
 with a union within the year following its certification, regardless of his
 doubt concerning its continued favor among the employees, he may reasonably
 refuse to participate in keeping employees tied to such union if he entertains a
 reasonable doubt as to its continued majority.  However, to the extent that an
 employer [**47]  seeks to justify its bargaining positions by asserting such a
 doubt, presumably his good faith can be tested by the appropriateness of his
 positions to the asserted end.
 
In the present case Mackessy maintained that he withdrew his offer of a
 maintenance-of-membership clause because, in view of his asserted doubt as to
 continuing majority, he would no longer commit Respondent to discharging any
 employees for not maintaining their union membership.  His position in this
 regard does not withstand analysis.
 
The ability of the employees to rid themselves of the Union would not be
 affected by the existence of a maintenance-of-membership clause, since it is
 well-established Board law that a union may not, even under a union-security
 provision, affect an employee's employment because of his sponsorship of a
 decertification petition.  International Molders' and Allied Workers Union,
 Local No. 125 (Blackhawk Tanning Co., Inc .), 178 NLRB 208 (1969); Tri-Rivers
 Marine Engineers Union (United States Steel Corporation ), 189 NLRB 838 (1971);
 Local Union No. 953, Textile Workers Union (Visinet Mill, Bemis Company, Inc. ),
 [*1319]  189 NLRB 598, 604 (1971). And even though, as previously [**48]
 observed, the union cards here used may have included an acceptance of union
 membership, the signing of such cards during the organizing campaign would not
 subject the signers to the rigors of a contractual maintenance-of-membership
 provision subsequently adopted unless they were willing to be so bound.
 International Brotherhood of Operative Potters, AFL-CIO (Macomb Pottery Company
 ), 171 NLRB 565 (1968); Fort Smith Outerwear, Inc., et al ., 205 NLRB 592, 593,
 fn. 3 (1973).
 
While it may be reasonable for an employer to resist compelling unwilling
 employees to join a union, it is quite a different matter to participate in
 requiring those who voluntarily join to maintain their membership so long as the
 union serves as the collective-bargaining representative.  Cf.  S & L Co., of
 Billings, supra . Respondent apparently took cognizance of this distinction
 when, while rejecting the Union's demand for a union-security shop, it
 originally offered a maintenance-of-membership provision.  However, in deciding
 to withdraw the proposal, Mackessy ignored the distinction, telling Sullivan
 that Respondent "just can't fire people because they don't want to join the
 union under any  [**49]  circumstances." This position is indistinguishable from
 that taken by Respondent at the beginning of the negotiations, when it offered
 a maintenance-of-membership clause as a counterproposal to the Union's request
 for a union-security provision.  A good-faith doubt as the Union's continuing
 majority could not rationally explain withdrawal of the
 maintenance-of-membership proposal, under which union membership would be
 required only of those people who voluntarily chose it.
 
In any event, I discredit Mackessy's claim of such good-faith doubt.  Without
 reviewing the detailed reasons for this credibility resolution, it is perhaps
 sufficient to point to Mackessy's insistence that he relied primarily on the
 apparent lack of employee support for the three strikes (principally the second
 and third), all of which occurred a considerable length of time after Respondent
 withdrew its maintenance-of-membership proposal.  Further, the employees'
 failure to support a strike does not in itself "necessarily indicate that they
 have repudiated the striking union as their bargaining representative." Palmer
 Asbestos & Rubber Corporation , 160 NLRB 723, 730 (1966); Frick Co ., 175 NLRB
 233, fn.  [**50]  1 (1969), enfd.  423 F.2d 1327 (C.A. 3, 1970); McCready &
 Sons, Inc ., 195 NLRB 28, fn. 1 (1972). Nor does employee turnover in the
 bargaining unit by itself justify a doubt of continuing majority.  Kentucky
 News, Incorporated , 165 NLRB 777, 778 (1967). Similarly, "undetailed rumors
 from unidentified sources that unrest and dissatisfaction existed" are
 insufficient.  Terrell Machine Company , 173 NLRB 1480, 1481-82 (1969).
 
Mackessy's demeanor, together with Respondent's failure to provide
 corroborative or specific evidence and the demonstrated falsity of his
 declaration of motivation, satisfies me "not only that the witness' testimony is
 not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story." Dyer v. MacDougall ,
 201 F.2d 265, 269 (C.A. 2), quoted with approval in N.L.R.B. v. Walton
 Manufacturing Co., et al ., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962).
 
While the withdrawal of an offer which the Union had rejected would not, in
 itself, warrant a conclusion of bad faith, the picture entirely changed when
 Mackessy volunteered a patently false explanation.  The explanation for
 Respondent's change of heart in April which comes to mind most readily is the
 hope of decertification [**51]  after end of the certification year in June.
 Mackessy's denial of such motivation was unimpressive.  When asked if he had
 ever discussed a decertification petition, he replied, unresponsively: "We've
 never filed a decertification certificate." When pressed further to state
 whether a decertification petition had ever been discussed, he replied: "With
 somebody else maybe, with the employees they've discussed it amongst themselves,
 but I have no knowledge of it and I've never discussed it." He volunteered that
 Respondent had not filed a certification petition in the past when it "had the
 Mine Workers in there for three years." While Respondent has not previously been
 found guilty of refusal to bargain in good faith, some 6 years of employee
 unionization and several strikes without ever reaching a contract suggest, at
 best, unusually hard bargaining and, more realistically, raise a suspicion of
 determination not to agree, which casts light on Respondent's present conduct.
 
On all the evidence (and the lack of evidence provided by Respondent), I find
 that the April 4 withdrawal of Respondent's proposal of a
 maintenance-of-membership clause was designed to prevent consummation of an
 agreement [**52]  before the end of the certification year.
 
b.  Wages
 
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
 give the Union information concerning the identity of the employees who would
 receive wage increases and the amount of individual raises under Respondent's
 proposal of a 5-1/2-percent increase to be distributed on a merit basis.
 Respondent contends that, as it told the Union during negotiations, it was
 unable to provide such information at the time, since the answers would depend
 on claculations to be made under a point system.  Respondent apparently also
 contends that computing and providing such information would be futile, since
 the Union would not accept the merit principle.
 
It has been held that an employer does not necessarily manifest bad faith by
 insisting upon a system of merit increases.  See, e.g., Technology Instrument
 Corporation , 187 NLRB 830, 841 (1971); Schweigers, Inc ., 185 NLRB 420, 423-424
 (1970), modified 453 F.2d 255 (C.A. 8, 1971).  However, a wage increase offer
 may be such as to negative good faith when, for example, as in the present case,
 it would leave to the employer virtually complete control as to who would [**53]
 receive increases.  See, e.g., Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corporation , 134
 NLRB 1733, 1744 (1961), enfd.  317 F.2d 527 (C.A. 10, 1963):
 In view of the record as a whole I am of the opinion and find that
 notwithstanding this offer, Respondent had no intention of entering into a
 contract with the Union and did not bargain in good faith as required by the
 Act.  Respondent undoubtedly was fully cognizant of the untenable position the
 Union would be in if it were to accept an offer resulting in a wage increase to
 only about half of the employees.  Accordingly it could  [*1320]  make the offer
 with reasonable assurance that it could not and would not be accepted....
 Similarly, in the present case it would appear on the face of it that the Union
 could not reasonably be expected to have employee support for wage increases
 without any prior indication of how much, if any, increase individual employees
 would receive.  This conclusion is perhaps strengthened by the fact that only 23
 percent of the employees had benefited from a merit increase granted in 1972.
 201 NLRB 450 at 451.
 
That the Union was repeatedly asking for a list of proposed individual
 increases clearly indicates that it had  [**54]  not irreversibly rejected
 Respondent's proposal in principle.  Respondent could hardly expect the Union to
 reverse its position and accept the merit principle as the sole basis for wage
 increases without knowing how the principle would be applied.
 
It is reasonable to assume that if the Respondent had been seriously
 attempting to reach agreement with the Union it would have made the effort to
 compile the list demanded by the Union.  In this connection it bears emphasis
 that the Union repeated its request when the only issues open were the
 maintenance-of-membership and wage issues, and the Union had offered to accept
 Respondent's original maintenance-of-membership proposal if coupled with a
 6-percent across-the-board wage increase. Thus computation of the actual
 individual increases could hardly be called premature, particularly since it was
 "in late 1971" that Mackessy had asked his supervisors to prepare a list for
 wage increases granted in April 1972.  201 NLRB 450 at 451. As has been said
 "preparation for discussion or its lack" is a significant factor in determining
 the good faith of a party to bargaining. N.L.R.B. v. W. R. Hall , 341 F.2d 359,
 362 (C.A. 10, 1965).  If,  [**55]  as Mackessy indicated, Respondent had a
 "point system" in effect, there is no apparent reason why he could not have met
 the Union's request.
 
Not only did Respondent fail to present the requested list of proposed
 individual wage increases, but, as I have previously found, it failed even to
 provide details as to an alleged objective point system to be used.  Manifestly
 the Union could not intelligently or reasonably appraise Respondent's proposal
 without that information.
 
c.  Conclusion as to Section 8(a)(5)
 
On the record as a whole, I find and conclude that Respondent, while
 appearing to bargain openly and in good faith, was actually progressively
 determined not to reach agreement within the certification year.  Its wage
 proposal, coupled with failure to provide the Union with the facts necessary for
 informed consideration of that proposal, and withdrawal of its porposal for a
 maintenance-of-membership clause about 2-1/2 months before the end of the
 certification year appear clearly calculated to prevent final agreement.  See
 N.L.R.B. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Association , 395 F.2d 745 (C.A.
 8, 1968).  As said in N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., Inc [**56]  ., 275 F.2d
 229, 232 (C.A. 5, 1960), "bad faith is prohibited though done with
 sophistication and finesse."
 
The complaint alleges refusal to bargain since January 26, 1973.  It was on
 that date that the Union presented its original economic demands.  In my opinion
 the evidence is insufficient to establish Respondent's bad faith at that time.
 While the bad faith may have commenced much earlier, the first hard evidence
 thereof came on April 4.
 
2.  Surveillance
 
That Respondent openly took pictures of peaceful picketing by employees
 during each of the three 1-day strikes is undisputed.  The evidence heretofore
 summarized establishes that the photography was not occasioned by any mass
 picketing, violence, or other unlawful conduct.  Mackessy indicated that he had
 taken pictures and had Rogers take pictures as a routine, sound practice,
 presumably to have a "record" in the event there might be some misconduct and
 Respondent should later decide to institute some form of legal action.Mackessy
 openly stated that one of the reasos for the picture taking was to identify the
 employees who picketed.  Although he did not expressly so testifiy, he
 apparently sought to justify an anticipatory [**57]  fear of misconduct by
 intimating that there had been some during the earlier strike, which Lamb and
 Sherman had directed at a time when an unspecified number of present employees
 had also been in its employ.
 
The Board has frequently held that, absent unusual circumstances, it
 constitutes unlawful surveillance of protected concerted activities for an
 employer to photograph his employees' peaceful picketing. R. D. Goss, Inc ., 203
 NLRB 1173 (1973); Puritana Manufacturing Corporation , 159 NLRB 518, 519, fn. 2
 (1966). On the other hand, it is permissible for an employer to photograph
 unlawful conduct on a picket line for the sincere purpose of securing evidence
 for use in an injunction action.  See, e.g., Stark Ceramics, Inc., 155 NLRB
 1258, 1269 (1965), enfd.  375 F.2d 202 (C.A. 6, 1967); Hilton Mobile Homes , 155
 NLRB 873, 874 (1965), enfd. in part 387 F.2d 7 (C.A. 8, 1967).  However, it is
 insufficient for an employer merely to claim that pictures were taken for use in
 litigation when they are not actually used for such purpose.  N.L.R.B. v. Rybold
 Heater Company , 408 F.2d 888, 891 (C.A. 6, 1969), enfg.  165 NLRB 331, 333-335
 (1967). And pictures of lawful,  [**58]  peaceful picketing cannot be so
 justified.  Radio Industries, Inc ., 101 NLRB 912, 914, 925 (1952).
 
It has recently been held that "the apparent photographing of outside union
 organizers and an employee, which was observed by one employee" was too isolated
 an occurrence to warrant a finding of a Section 8(a)(1) violation.  Summit
 Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc ., 204 NLRB 70, fn. 1 (1973). On the other
 hand, repeated photographing of peaceful picketing by employees is inherently
 coercive.  Russell Sportswear Corp ., 197 NLRB 1116 (1972), enforcement denied
 on other grounds § 3 LRRM 2225, 71 LC P13,667 (C.A. 6, 1973).  Manifestly it is
 difficult, if not impossible, to construct any precise formula for determining
 the circumstances under which an employer would have a legitimate reason for
 taking pictures of picket activity by his employees.
 
But it has been held that purely "anticipatory" photographing of peaceful
 picketing "in the event something 'might' happen does not justify Respondent's
 conduct  [*1321]  when balanced against the tendency of that conduct to
 interfere with the employees' right to engage in concerted activity." Flambeau
 Plastics Corporation, 167 NLRB [**59]  735, 743 (1967), enfd.  401 F.2d 128, 136
 (C.A. 7, 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1019 (1969). This ruling appears to fit
 the present case precisely.
 
Accordingly, I find that, as alleged, by photographing the picketing on April
 23 and May 1 and 7.  Respondent engaged in unlawful surveillance in violation of
 Section 8(a)(1).
 
3.  The DePalma incident
 
As set forth above, there is no dispute that DePalma demanded the presence
 of fellow employee Glaletta, a member of the Union's negotiating committee, as a
 condition of reporting to Rodgers' office when ordered to do so on April 27.
 Although Respondent contends that the purpose of the interview was not "
 disciplinary." Rodgers conceded that "most of the times" be talked to DePalma in
 the office it was "to reprimand her for one thing or another", that he had
 previously given her two written reprimands, one for errors in her production
 count; and that on April 27 he intended to talk to her about her erroneous
 production counts and warn her that if her work did not improve "something more
 severe would happen." To say that such an anticipated interview would not be "
 disciplinary" makes a mockery of words.  And certainly DePalma's prior history,
 [**60]  which included being denied a wage increase in part at least because of
 erroneous production cards, would lead her reasonably to fear that she was in
 danger of disciplinary action.
 
The nature and extent of an employee's statutory right, if any, to be
 represented in interviews with management is currently the subject of
 considerable legal controversy.  A majority of the present Board members
 (Chairman Miller and Members Fanning and Jenkins) subscribe to the view that the
 employee has a right to such representation in any interview, whether strictly "
 disciplinary" or merely preliminarily investigatory. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 NLRB
 197 (1972); Mobil Oil Corporation, 196 NLRB 1052 (1972); J. Weingarten, Inc.,
 202 NLRB 446 (1973); New York Telephone Company, 203 NLRB 1153 (1973); National
 Can Corporation, 200 NLRB 1116 (1972).Member Penello holds that the statutory
 right to representation extends only to strictly disciplinary interviews and
 does not cover preliminary investigatory interviews. National Can Corp., supra;
 J. Weingarten, Inc., supra . Member Kennedy, however, believes that there is no
 statutorily protected right in an employee to have representation [**61]  at
 interviews with management; in his view, any such right can arise only through
 contract.  Mobil Oil Corporation, supra; J. Weingarten, Inc., supra . The courts
 which have passed on the question to date have rejected the Board's majority
 view in favor of Member Kennedy's position.  N.L.R.B. v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481
 F.2d 1018 (C.A. 4); Mobil Oil Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 482 F.2d 842 (C.A. 7).  J.
 Weingarten, Inc. is now pending in the Fifth Circuit on the Board's petition for
 enforcement (No. 73-1891).  n19 [ 485 F.2d 1135, reversed and remanded 420 U.S.
 251 (1975).] Whatever the ultimate resolution of the issue, presumably by
 decision of the Supreme Court, I am now bound by the Board's Decisions cited
 above.  Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963), enfd. in part 331
 F.2d 176 (C.A. 8, 1964).
 
n19 The cases here cited were all decided under Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act.  It
 would serve no useful purpose to discuss related decisions in which the Board
 has held that denial of union representation in employee interviews with
 management may violate Sec. 8(a)(5).  See, e.g., Western Electric Company,
 Hawthorne Works, 198 NLRB 623 (1972). The Board's Decisions in such cases have
 also fared badly in the courts.  See Analysis, 83 LRRM 49. [**62]
 
While the Board Decisions clearly establish the existence of some statutory
 right for a employee to be represented in any interview with management which
 might, or which the employee reasonably fears might, lead to eventual
 disciplinary or other action affecting employment security, the precise nature
 of such right is not clear.  All the cases cited speak generally in terms of the
 right to "union representation," or to representation by the employee's
 "statutory representative." So far as appears, in all those cases there were
 collective-bargaining agreements under which presumably union representatives
 were recognized for "grievance" purposes.  In none of them was any question
 raised concerning the authority of the particular union representatives chosen
 to represent or appear with the employee.
 
Although Respondent did not present oral argument or file a brief in the
 present case, counsel's examination of witnesses suggests that Respondent
 maintains that DePalma could not insist on Galetta's presence since Galetta was
 not a proper "union representative." To support this contention, Respondent's
 counsel examined Galetta as follows:
 
Q.  (By Mr. Sullivan)...  Now, are you [**63]  a steward in the union?
 
A.  I'm a member of the negotiating team.
 
Q.  And no stewards have been elected or officers?
 
A.  To my knowledge I was just voted in as a member of the regotiating team.
 member of the negotiating team.
 
Q.  And to your knowledge the company has not been informed as to any
 designated representatives, on the premises, of the employees?
 
A.  Well, I would say they are advised because we have to ask permission to
 leave to go to negotiating meetings, so they had been advised to that extent.
 
Q.  Other than the fact that you're on the negotiating team, you have no
 other assigned duties then, I take it?
 
A.  I know of none, no other assigned duties but my job.
 In this connection, it is intersting to note that the Case 3- CA-4881, 201 NLRB
 450 at 451, it is stated that "in the spring of 1971 [DePalma] was elected union
 steward for the employees on the first shift." There is no evidence in the
 present record concerning DePalma's current status.  However, according to the
 uncontradicted testimony of both Galetta and DePalma, Respondent made it clear
 that, in the absence of a collective-bargaining agreement, it  [*1322]  would
 not recognize any "union representative"  [**64]  for employees.  n20
 
n20 When informed that Galetta was appearing as a "union representative," or
 "witness," Rodgers said: "Nina, you do not have a union and we do not recognize
 a union."
 
Administrative Law Judge von Rohr has apparently accepted Respondent's
 present position that an employee's right in situations like the present is
 limited to representation by a person previously identified to the employer as
 an authorized representative of the union.  ( First National Bank of New Smprna
 Beach, 204 NLRB 127, 135 (1973).) However, that ruling was never reviewed by the
 Board, but rather was simply adopted pro forma, in the absence of exceptions.
 (204 NLRB 127.) Accordingly, I do not consider it as binding precedent.  For
 reasons hereafter set forth, I respectfully disagree with Judge von Rohr's
 Decision.
 
The Board has made it unequivocally clear that its rulings are not based on
 or designed to vindicate the union's status as bargaining representative, but
 rather the employees' right to engage in concerted activity.For example, in
 Quality Manufacturing Company, supra, 195 NLRB at 198, the Board said:
 
After reflection, we have concluded that it is a serious violation [**65]  of
 an employee's individual right to be represented by his union if he can only
 request or insist on such representation under penalty of disciplinary action.
 And while the employer's denial of such a request may not derogate the
 bargaining rights of the union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5), in the case of
 a purely investigatory interview, this is not to say either: (a) that the
 employer may discipline the employee for demanding representation; or (b) that
 the employer may insist, by threatening to discipline the employee's
 representative, that the interview be held without his presence.
 
As to the first question, the violation seems to us clear and unequivocal.
 The underlying considerations were explicated in Mobil Oil Corporation as
 follows (196 NLRB 1052):
 
An employee's right to union representation upon request is based on Section
 7 of the Act which guarantees the right of employees to act in concert for
 "mutual aid and protection." The denial of this right has a reasonable tendency
 to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in violation of Section
 8(a)(1) of the Act.  Thus, it is a serious violation of the employee's
 individual right to engage in concerted activity [**66]  by seeking the
 assistance of his statutory representative of the employer denies the employee's
 request and compels the employee to appear unassisted at an interview which
 might put his job security in jeopardy.  Such a dilution of the employee's right
 to act collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, unwarranted
 interference with his right to insist on concerted protection, rather than
 individual self-protection, against possible adverse employer action.  [Emphasis
 supplied.]
 
It thus appears that the right involved is not dependent upon the existence
 of a union as the collective-bargaining representative.  Under the rationale of
 Quality Mfg. Co. and Mobil, DePalma would have had the right to refuse to attend
 the interview in Rodgers' office without the presence of a fellow employee even
 if there were no union on the scene whatsoever.  That only DePalma was in
 jeopardy does not present her enlisting a fellow employee's support; it is
 protected concerted activity when employees join together to protest employer
 action against an individual.  N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates
 Company, Inc., 130 F.2d 503, 505-506 (C.A. 2, 1942).  [**67]  As I see the
 matter, DePalma was, in the words of Mobil, asserting her "right to insist on
 concerted protection, rather than individual self-protection, against possible
 adverse employer action." It is undoubtedly recognition of this right which led
 Mackessy to permit DePalma to have a fellow employee present when she was
 interviewed by management on October 21, 1971, before the Union had been
 certified.  (Case 3-CA-4715.) n21
 
n21 Since DePalma was acting pursuant to instructions or advice given by the
 Union's managers and there was no relevant contractual provision or
 understanding between the Union and Respondent, it is unnecessary in the present
 case to consider what limitations might be placed on the Quality Mfg. and Mobil
 Oil rule by Sec. 9(a) of the Act or by a contract.  Cf.  Western Electric
 Company, 198 NLRB 623 (1972), Chairman Miller's concurring opinion; Western
 Addition Company Organization v. N.L.R.B., 485 F.2d 917 (C.A.D.C., 1973).
 
For the foregoing reasons, I find and conclude that, as alleged in the
 complaint, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on April 27 by
 refusing to permit Galetta to accompany DePalma in an interview [**68]  with
 Rodgers and by disciplining DePalma for refusing to participate in the interview
 without the presence of Galetta.  n22
 
n22 As did the Board in Quality Mfg. Co., supra, 195 NLRB at 199, fn. 8, I
 refrain from determining whether, as the complaint alleges, the discipline of
 DePalma also violated Sec. 8(a)(1), since such a determination would not affect
 the remedy.
 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
1.  Since April 4, 1973, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
 by failing to bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
 representative of its employees in the following appropriate bargaining unit:
 All production and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at its 432
 North Franklin Street, Syracuse, New York, plant, excluding all office clerical
 employees, casual employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as
 defined in the Act.
 
2.  By photographing the picketing of Respondent's plant on April 23 and May
 1 and 7, 1973, Respondent has engaged in unlawful surveillance and thus has
 committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
 Act.
 
3.  By refusing to permit Dorothy Galetta to accompany Nina DePalma as [**69]
 an interview in the office of Respondent's management representative on April
 27, 1973, and by disciplining DePalma for refusing to participate in such
 interview without the presence of Galetta, Respondent has engaged in unfair
 labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
 
4.  The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning
 of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
 
[*1323]  THE REMEDY
 
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall
 recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take
 affirmative action of the type customarily ordered in such cases.
 
Because the evidence indicates that Respondent has been bargaining in had
 faith in the hope that a successful decertification petition will be forthcoming
 at the end of the certification year, I shall recommend that the certification
 year be extended through 1 year after Respondent commences to bargain in good
 faith.  Big Three Industries, Inc., 201 NLRB 700 (1973).I shall also recommend
 that Respondent be required to meet the Union's requests for relevant
 information reasonably necessary for contract negotiations.
 
Having found that Nina DePalma [**70]  was unlawfully disciplined on April
 27, 1973, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to expunge all reference
 to the incident from its records and to compensate her for any loss of pay she
 suffered as a result of such discrimination, such compensation to include
 interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with Isis Plumbing &
 Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
 
I shall also recommend that Respondent be required to destroy all
 photographic evidence it obtained by its unlawful surveillance.
 
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the
 entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
 hereby issue the following recommended:
 
ORDER n23
 
n23 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
 Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
 conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of
 the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings,
 conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for
 all purposes.
 
The Respondent, Glomac Plastics, Inc., Syracuse, New York, its officers,
 [**71]  agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
 
1.  Cease and desist from:
 
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith concerning wages, hours,
 and other terms and conditions of employment with Textile Workers Union of
 America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive representative of all production and
 maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at its 432 North Franklin
 Street, Syracuse, New York, plant, excluding all office clerical employees,
 casual employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
 the Act.
 
(b) Refusing to furnish the aforesaid Union, upon request, information
 concerning the specific individual wage increases which would be granted under
 Respondent's contract proposal and concerning the precise method of determining
 such increases, as well as any other information relevant and material to the
 bargaining between the parties.
 
(c) Engaging in unlawful surveillance of its employees' protected concerted
 activities by photographing such activities.
 
(d) Requiring, by threats of discipline or otherwise, that any employee take
 part in an interview or meeting with any supervisor or representative of
 Respondent without the presence of an employee [**72]  representative if such
 representation has been requested by the employee and if the employee has
 reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed may result in
 subjecting the employee to disciplinary action.
 
(e) Disciplining any employee for refusing to take part without
 representation in any interview or meeting where the employee has reasonable
 grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed may result in the employee's
 being the subject of disciplinary action.
 
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing
 employees in the exercise of their right to engage in, or to refrain from
 engaging in, any or all of the activities specified in Section 7 of the Act,
 except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
 membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized
 in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
 Disclosure Act of 1959.
 
2.  Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
 of the Act:
 
(a) Bargain collectively in good faith concerning wages, hours, and other
 terms and conditions of employment with Textile Workers [**73]  Union of
 America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive representative of all production and
 maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at its 432 North Franklin
 Street, Syracuse, New York, plant, excluding all office clerical employees,
 casual employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
 the Act.
 
(b) Furnish the aforesaid Union, on request, information concerning the
 specific individual wage increases which would be granted under Respondent's
 contract proposal and concerning the precise method of determining such
 increases, as well as all other information relevant and material to the
 bargaining between the parties.
 
(c) Expunge from its records all reference to any disciplinary or other
 action taken with respect to Nina DePalma or Dorothy Galetta related to
 DePalma's attempt to have Galetta accompany her at an interview with management
 representatives on April 27, 1973.
 
(d) Destroy all photographs and copies thereof (including both negatives and
 positives) taken by or on behalf of Respondent of picketing of Respondent's
 plant on April 23 and May 1 and 7, 1973.
 
(e) Compensate Nina DePalma for any pay she lost by reason of her leaving
 work early on April [**74]  27, 1973, said compensation to include interest at
 the rate of 6 percent per annum.
 
(f) Post at its facility in Syracuse, New York, copies of the attached notice
 marked "Appendix." n24 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
 Director for Region 3, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative,
 [*1324]  shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
 maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
 including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
 Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
 defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
n24 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
 Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
 National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
 United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor
 Relations Board."
 
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing, within 20 days
 from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
 herewith.
 

APPENDIX
 NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
 POSTED BY ORDER  [**75]  OF THE
 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
 An Agency of the United States Government
 
After a hearing in which all parties had the chance to give evidence, it has
 been decided that we, Glomac Plastics, Inc., have violated the National Labor
 Relations Act and we have been ordered to post this notice.  We intend to abide
 by the following:
 
WE WILL, in good faith, bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of
 America, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive representative of all production and
 maintenance employees employed by us at our 423 North Franklin Street, Syracuse,
 New York, plant, excluding all office clerical employees, casual employees,
 professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.  Regard
 the Union as exclusive agent as if the initial year of certification has been
 extended for an additional year from the commencement of bargaining pursuant
 hereto.
 
WE WILL, upon request, furnish to the Union all information relevant and
 material to the bargaining between us.
 
WE WILL compensate Nina DePalma for any pay the lost because she refused to
 be interviewed by a management representative on April 27, 1973, without an
 employee or union representative being present.  [**76]
 
WE WILL expunge from our records any and all reference to the incident on
 April 27, 1973, in which we refused to permit Dorothy Galetta to accompany Nina
 DePalma in an interview requested by Plant Manager William H. Rodgers.
 
WE WILL destroy all photographs (and copies and negatives hereof) that we
 took of picket activities at our plant on April 23 and May 1 and 7, 1973.
 
WE WILL NOT, by photographing or otherwise, engage in surveillance of the
 peaceful picketing or other protected concerted activities of our employees.
 
WE WILL NOT require any employee to take part in an interview or meeting
 where the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the matter or matters
 to be discussed may result in the employee's being the subject of disciplinary
 action and where we have refused that employee's request to be represented at
 such meeting by a union or other employee representative.
 
All our employees are free to become or remain or refrain from becoming or
 remaining members of the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any
 other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected
 by an agreement in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of the National [**77]  Labor
 Relations Act, as amended.
 
GLOMAC PLASTICS, INC.